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ABSTRACT 
The philosophical and intellectual trajectories of Iris Murdoch and Alasdair MacIntyre run 
parallel although no apparent convergence. Sometimes A. MacIntyre refers to I. Murdoch, 
but there is not an explicit recognition of Murdoch's ideas in his work. Despite this, one can 
find some ideological parallels between the two authors. The paper tries to highlight the 
thematic similarities between the philosophical theses of Iris Murdoch and Alasdair 
MacIntyre leaving aside whether such points held in common may be explained by 
Murdoch’s influence on the Scottish writer. 
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0. Introduction 
 
Little is known or written about the relationship between the philosophy of Iris 
Murdoch and the philosophy of Alasdair MacIntyre. They are separated by ten 
years and attended different universities for their academic training in 
philosophy. While we have some texts by MacIntyre in which reference is made 
to Murdoch, no reference to the Scottish writer appears in Murdoch’s writings. 
A consideration of the philosophical relationship between the two thinkers 
leads us to a first question: are the affinities between their philosophical 
approaches the product of following a parallel path that brought them to 
philosophical conclusions that are similar in a number of aspects; or do we see 
that Murdoch exercised some influence on MacIntyre’s thought?  The texts of 
MacIntyre that make reference to Murdoch demonstrate his sound knowledge 
of her literary and philosophical work, but he acknowledges no philosophical 
influence, unless that is the intention of his general remark: “Iris Murdoch has 
once again put us all in her debt.”1 The lack of such an acknowledgement from 
                                                 
1A. MACINTYRE, Which World do you See?, “The New York Times Book Review”, January 
1993, 3, p. 9. 
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MacIntyre does not stop Michael Schwartz, for example, from openly declaring 
some influence: “I argue that Murdoch has been a formative influence upon 
MacIntyre both with her philosophical work and her expressed ambitions for 
the novel.”2. Heather Widdows concurs: “Key thinkers that cite her moral 
philosophy as influential on their own work include Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Charles Taylor, John MacDowell and Stanley Hauerwas”3. Widdows’s text 
refers the reader to statements of acknowledgement made by Hauerwas, Taylor 
and MacDowell, but none from MacIntyre, despite the remark in the text. We 
must suppose that Widdows is convinced of the influence of Murdoch’s 
philosophy on MacIntyre, but she cites no text by MacIntyre that explicitly 
supports her claim. Starting from this point, the most fitting approach would 
appear to be showing the points of convergence between Murdoch and 
MacIntyre, while leaving aside whether such points held in common may be 
explained by Murdoch’s influence on the Scottish writer. 
All philosophical ideas developed by an author are contained within a 
theoretical frame of reference from which they gain meaning; the framework 
precedes the ideas. The theoretical frame of reference comes to be the 
perspective adopted by the author, a perspective that affects all of her 
appraisals. One could say that, behind the explicit expression of an author’s 
philosophical thought, there is a position taken with respect to how we have 
become who we are, what we now have, and what would be desirable in the 
future.  
When we examine the relationship between two authors, we can focus on 
the philosophical perspectives they adopt, the development of their 
philosophical ideas, or both matters. This third choice is the path adopted here 
to examine Murdoch and MacIntyre. The aim of the paper is to draw out points 
of affinity between the two philosophers in terms of the philosophical 
perspectives they adopt when doing philosophy and in terms of the ideas they 
develop within the framework of their adopted perspectives. Our intention is to 
indicate the points of philosophical relation between Murdoch and MacIntyre 
without completing an exhaustive exploration of each and every one of these 
points.  
 
 
                                                 
2M. SCHWARTZ, Moral Vision: Iris Murdoch and Alasdair MacIntyre, “Journal of Business 
Ethics”, 90 (2009), p. 316. 
3H. WIDDOWS, The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch, Aldesrhot, Ashgate 2005, p. 17. 
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1. Affinities in their perspectives 
 
The perspective adopted by each author in doing philosophy can refer to their 
appraisal of the past as a cause of the present, of the present itself, and also of 
the future, understood as the direction toward which the present should be 
headed and with the experience of the present point out the paths to be 
followed in the future.   
Murdoch and MacIntyre are interested in contemporary moral philosophy, 
but they both find that a sound way to understand its characteristics is to 
analyse the historical periods that have led to the present moment. At the 
beginning of The Sovereignty of Good (SG), Murdoch writes: 
I wish in this discussion to attempt a movement of return, a retracing of 
our steps to see how a certain position was reached. The position in 
question, in current moral philosophy, is one which seems to me 
unsatisfactory (...)4. 
And in the second chapter of After Virtue (AV), MacIntyre states: 
(…) I am not merely contending that morality is not what it once was, but 
also and more importantly that what once was morality has to some large 
degree disappeared –and that this marks a degeneration, a grave cultural 
loss. I am therefore committed to two distinct but related tasks.  
The first is that of identifying and describing the lost morality of the past 
and of evaluating its claims to objectivity and authority; this is a task partly 
historical and partly philosophical.”5. 
Murdoch’s intention is to go back in time in order to see the paths that have 
led to the current situation, in which the reigning moral theory ignores certain 
facts and prevails without any relation to other moral theories. In 
“Metaphysics and Ethics” she states “To understand current moral philosophy 
it is necessary to understand its history”6. 
MacIntyre’s starting point is to analyze the moral emotivism that 
characterizes Western society and the question to which he seeks an answer in 
                                                 
4I. MURDOCH, The Sovereignty of Good, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980, p. 2. 
5A. MACINTYRE, After Virtue. A Study in Moral Theory, Notre Dame, University of Notre 
Dame Press, p. 22. 
6I. MURDOCH, Metaphysics and Ethics, in: Existentialists and Mystics, New York, Penguin 
Books 1999, p. 59. 
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the pages of AV is how we have arrived at this situation. In search of a reason, 
he turns to the past: 
 
What I am going to suggest is that the key episodes in the social history 
which transformed, fragmented and (...) largely displaced morality (...) were 
episodes inthe history of philosophy, that it is only in the light of that 
history that we can understand how the idiosyncrasies of everyday 
contemporary moral discourse came to be and thus how the emotivist self 
was able to find a means of expression7. 
 
The point that brings Murdoch and MacIntyre closer is not the historical 
moment to which they turn to explain the present. Neither is it the present 
which they are analyzing8, rather, it is their conviction that the key to 
understanding the present is to retrace the historical steps that have served to 
produce it.  
Contemporary moral philosophy speaks of a self that has last the 
foundations that historically supported it. For Murdoch:  
It is significant that the idea of goodness (and of virtue) has been largely 
superseded in Western moral philosophy by the idea of rightness, supported 
perhaps by some conception of sincerity. This is to some extent a natural 
outcome of the disappearance of a permanent background: a permanent 
background, whether provided by God, by Reason, by History or by the 
self9. 
Further: 
From Moore to Wittgenstein, the I has become a will, an isolated I. On the 
one hand, Moore’s question ‘What does good mean’- concerned the will, 
and, secondly, Wittgenstein's criticisms of Cartesian ego presented the 
moral agent as an isolated will "(...) operating with the concepts of 'ordinary 
language’10 
MacIntyre attributes the existence of this self to a different cause: 
                                                 
7 AV, p.36. 
8 Coincidence also appears partly in their assessment of the present. 
9 SG, p.53. 
10 SG, p. 48. 
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The problems of modern moral theory emerge clearly as the product of the 
failure of the Enlightenment project. On the one hand the individual moral 
agent, freed from hierarchy and teleology, conceives of himself and is 
conceived of by moral philosophers as sovereign in his moral authority11. 
For MacIntyre, the failure of the ethics of Kant, for whom moral choices 
had their foundation in reason, gave way to Kierkegaard’s thesis, which holds 
that moral choices act as their own foundation12. 
The idea that emotions could provide a basis for moral choice receives a 
negative appraisal from both authors. When Jo Brans interviews Murdoch, she 
asks her how philosophy could become corrupted and she responds: 
(...) [V]arious kinds of existentialist philosophy and Oxford philosophy, 
which attempted to explain value judgments as emotive statements or 
arbitrary acts of the will. This has distorted moral philosophy in recent 
years by suggesting that one has got to make a sharp decision between fact 
and value; and if something isn’t factual, in the sense of scientific fact, and 
so presentable in some way, it belongs to a shadowy world, of private will 
and emotion, so that moral attitudes would simply be private emotional 
attitudes of one sort or another (...)13. 
By comparison, MacIntyre says: 
The appearance of emotivism in this variety of philosophical guises suggest 
strongly that it is indeed in terms of a confrontation with emotivism that 
my own thesis must be defined. For one way of framing my contention that 
morality is not what it once was is just to say that to a large degree people 
now think, talk and act as if emotivism were true, no matter what their 
avowed theoretical standpoint may be14. 
If we understand Murdoch’s ethical-philosophical project as Jessy E.G. 
Jordan does, in terms of “an anti-Enlightenment genealogical narrative”(V), 
the affinity between Murdoch and MacIntyre becomes even closer. Jordan links 
the interpretative narratives of Gadamer, Murdoch and MacIntyre: 
                                                 
11 AV, p.62. 
12 AV, p. 49. 
13 G. DOOLEY, From a Tiny Corner in the House of Fiction, University of South Carolina 
Press, Columbia 2003, p. 157. 
14 AV, p. 22. 
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Thus, the three narratives toward which I have been repeatedly drawn are 
those written by Hans-Georg Gadamer, Alasdair MacIntyre, and Iris 
Murdoch. Each of these narratives is unique. They use different casts of 
characters, diagnose different problems, and suggest different solutions. 
(…) MacIntyre highlights the tragic consequences of the loss of a 
teleological framework; and Murdoch emphasizes the dangers inherent in 
the eclipse of consciousness and the vanishing of the philosophical self. 
Whereas MacIntyre posits a neo-Aristotelian account as the solution to our 
moral woes(...) and Murdoch offers a neo-Platonic account, (...)Yet, even 
with the many differences between these accounts, their projects are not 
entirely incompatible15. 
The diagnosis of the situation is the same. Although Murdoch and 
MacIntyre may stress different aspects, their theses follow a certain parallelism, 
for example, in their references to the impoverishment of moral language. 
Heather Widdows also highlights it: “Murdoch prefigures MacIntyre, as in 1958 
she declared that ‘a religious and moral vocabulary is the possession now of a 
few’”16. 
For both Murdoch and MacIntyre, moral language reflects the way in 
which we think about reality. The empire of empiricist philosophy has led to 
thinking about human beings in terms that leave our inner lives reduced, 
placing stress on what can be observed and quantified in such a way that moral 
language is affected:“We have suffered a general loss of concepts, the loss of a 
moral and political vocabulary”17. 
MacIntyre starts After Virtue with a fictitious situation in which words 
remain but the references that give them significance have disappeared:  
The hypothesis which I wish to advance is that in the actual world which 
we inhabit the language of morality is in the same state of disorder as the 
language of natural science in the imaginary world which I described. (...) 
We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the 
                                                 
15 J.E.G. JORDAN, Iris Murdoch’s Genealogy of the Modern Self: Retrieving Consciousness 
Beyond the Linguistic Turn. PhD Dissertation, Baylor University, 2008, 
https://beardocs.baylor.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/2104/5240/Jessy_Jordan_phd.pdf?seque
nce=1. 
16 WIDDOWS,The Moral Vision of Iris Murdoch, p. 167 
17 EM, p. 290 
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key expressions. But we have (...) lost our comprehension, both theoretical 
and practical, of morality18. 
Murdoch is a great champion of the use of metaphor as a vehicle for 
showing what is difficult to understand, and MacIntyre follows suit, in practice. 
As Edward T. Oakes observes, “(...) MacIntyre has come up with a metaphor to 
explain exactly why it is that moral debate in today’s society is so shrill and so 
rarely leads to consensus—why, in other words, society seems utterly incapable 
of coming to enough basic agreement in matters of ethics to enable it to deal 
with the moral chaos that surrounds us”19. 
The coincidence between Murdoch and MacIntyre affects their writings on 
the loss of language but, because their writings derive from different 
philosophical approaches, they are, as a consequence, different as well. While 
MacIntyre relates the depleted meaning of concepts to the loss of the social 
fabric that made them comprehensible, Murdoch, who does not enter into the 
social realm in her reflections, links the depletion of concepts to the image of 
human beings offered in contemporary philosophy. Cora Diamond compares the 
writings of the two philosophers to highlight that their appreciation of the loss 
of concepts is different: “Iris Murdoch is not saying, as MacIntyre is, that we 
lack the kind of life within which such concepts as we need could be intelligibly 
applied. He says that we are naked irrational wills disguised as moral reasoners; 
she (...) says that what goes with our present depleted moral vocabulary is that 
we appear to be such wills”20.Both speak of humans today in terms of a 
subjective, naked will, but both also recognize that ordinary people have a 
different experience of what philosophy attempts to explain in an alternative 
manner. The example of the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law analyses by 
Murdoch in SG, a situation that can be found in daily life, is hard to explain 
using the image of human beings found in contemporary philosophy. Murdoch 
draws a clear distinction between the concept of humans offered by philosophy 
and the way real people live and feel:“The ordinary person does not, unless 
corrupted by philosophy, believe that he creates values by choices. He thinks 
that some things really are better than others and that he is capable of getting 
it wrong. We are not usually in doubt about the direction in which Good lies”21. 
We move in two worlds, the one offered by philosophical explanations and the 
                                                 
18 AV, p. 2. 
19 T.E. OAKES, The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre, “First Things”, 65 (1996), p.22. 
20 C. DIAMOND, (1988). Losing your Concepts, “Ethics” 98 (1988), p. 262. 
21 SG, p. 97. 
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other one of real people who, as Murdoch puts it, do not correspond with the 
ones in philosophy. This dualism, however, must be bridged by setting aside the 
philosophical explanations that do not reflect the real essence of ordinary 
humans: “(...) [I]f a moral philosophy does not give a satisfactory or sufficiently 
rich account of what we unphilosophically know to be goodness, then away 
with it.”22. 
At the beginning of "Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues 
and Goods" MacIntyre also refers to the relationship between everyday life and 
philosophy to make clear that, while there are philosophies that respond to 
issues of everyday life, there are others that completely separate these two 
activities: 
What is the relationship between the moral philosopher’s judgments about 
the life of practice and the every plain person’s moral questions and 
judgments? Moral philosophers are of course themselves in most of their 
lives everyday plain persons, but on some views what they do and judge 
qua moral philosopher is very different from what they do and judge qua 
plain person. Some analytic philosophers, for example, have envisaged the 
relationship between moral philosophy and every day moral judgments as 
analogous to that between the philosophy of science and the judgments and 
activity of the natural scientist or that between the philosophy of law and 
legal practice. In each such case the philosophy is to be understood as 
detached second-order commentary upon first-order judgments and 
activity23 
 
2. Affinities in their ideas: Narrativity24 
 
For MacIntyre, each life is a story, a narration in which the protagonist is 
author and actor, the main actor in his own story and a secondary actor in the 
narration of other lives. A person’s actions fit and are intelligible within the 
                                                 
22 EM, p. 205. 
23 MACINTYRE, Plain Persons, p. 3. 
24 An article by PAMELA M. HALL, Limits of the Story: Tragedy in Recent Virtue Ethics, 
“Studies in Christian Ethics”, 17(2004)1, examines “(...) how tragedy, in narrative as in the 
world, functions within the ethics of MacIntyre and Murdoch”, p. 2, and concludes that the 
meaning of tragedy in human life is different for Murdoch and MacIntyre. 
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narration of his own life25because the human being is an animal that tells 
stories:“(...) man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, 
essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his 
history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth”26. 
For Murdoch, the reflective activity of the mind serves to internalize the 
events and circumstances of a life and these events and circumstances become 
personal through such reflection. What we experience we explain to ourselves 
and to others in the form of a story that takes on meaning. We are, as Murdoch 
says, story-tellers who use stories to create reality: “The story is a way of 
thinking, it is a fundamental mode of consciousness, or self-being”27.It is not 
only that we tell stories to others, but also to ourselves, because stories enable 
us to make judgments, evaluate and make sense of the world and our role in it: 
“My life is experienced by me as a narration, in the course of which I 
appropriate its ‘accidents’ (...)”28. 
Story-telling is at the heart of literature, which Murdoch calls a way to seek 
and reveal the truth: “(...) philosophy and literature are both truth-seeking and 
truth-revealing activities.”29. The article by Michael Schwartz  refers to this 
parallelism. 
 
Tradition 
 
At the very beginning of SG, when Murdoch considers the characteristics of 
philosophy today, she makes reference to the difficulty of understanding 
philosophies that are distant from our own tradition, as well as philosophies 
that rival it in their ability to explain the phenomenon of morality:  
The position (...) in current moral philosophy is one which seems to me 
unsatisfactory in two related ways, in that it ignores certain facts and at 
the same time imposes a single theory which admits of no communication 
with or escape into rival theories. (...) [I]n an attempt to enlarge our field of 
vision we turn for a moment to philosophical theories outside our own 
                                                 
25 However, while MacIntyre sees teleology as part of life, as in unpredictability (After 
Virtue 215), Murdoch explicitly denies that a human life can have a teleological meaning 
(The Sovereignty of Good 79). 
26 AV, p.216. 
27 EM, p. 252. 
28 EM, p. 127. 
29 EM, p. 11. 
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tradition and we find it very difficult to establish any illuminating 
connection30. 
Murdoch goes on to remark on the most notable traits of the philosophy of 
George Edward Moore to reach what truly interests her, the concept of human 
beings employed by Stuart Hampshire in his works. Although Murdoch does 
not develop the concept of “tradition” or “rivalry” as subsequently developed 
broadly in texts by MacIntyre, she does certainly make use of them. MacIntyre 
defines tradition as “(...) an historically extended, socially embodied argument, 
and an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that 
tradition”31.Rivalry between traditions arises from their desire to explain the 
same reality through different concepts and ideas. MacIntyre refers to the 
conceptual incommensurability of rival argumentation. Each argument is or 
can be logically valid, but it is not possible to establish which of the premises 
underpinning each argument has a greater claim to validity. As a result, all 
dialogue between incommensurable argumentations is non-viable. As Murdoch 
puts it, philosophical debates, in order to be fruitful, need for the debaters to 
share some principles or criteria from which they can set out their opposing 
viewpoints. Otherwise, the confrontation is doomed to failure:“Moral 
arguments will be difficult or impossible where the differences are differences of 
criteria”32. 
 
Authority 
 
Focusing on the notion of “authority” in the two authors, we find that it is 
used in the same sense, but applied to different fields. In the texts of Murdoch 
and MacIntyre, the term “authority” is used in the sense of commanding 
respect in exchange for progress or knowledge. For Murdoch, it is very clear 
that acknowledging what lies beyond us and prevails on us is the only path 
toward gaining knowledge of it. The recognition of authority goes hand-in-hand 
with an attitude of self-abnegation and trust, which is repaid with knowledge. 
Murdoch uses the example of learning a language: “If I am learning, for 
instance, Russian, I am confronted by an authoritative structure which 
                                                 
30 SG, p. 1-2. 
31 AV, p. 222. 
32 EM, p. 81. 
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commands my respect. (...) My work is a progressive revelation of something 
which exists independently of me”33. 
MacIntyre speaks of authority as one of the elements necessary to learning 
a practice34because obedience to the rules defining a practice is fundamental: 
“To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the 
inadequacy of my own performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own 
attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and 
partially define the practice”35.This is the case with research, for which 
acknowledging the authorityof a number of texts is the first, essential step 
toward understanding them. The credibility of the texts is granted to them by 
whoever wishes to study them and understand them; at the same time, this is 
the necessary requirement for their intellection. Learning a language may also 
be understood as a practice with rules to which the learner must yield in order 
to gain mastery. What the concepts of authority used by Murdoch and 
MacIntyre have in common is that they rest on the trust, respect and obedience 
of learning as an indispensable condition for the attainment of knowledge. At 
the same time, acknowledging the authority of that which lies beyond me and 
which I must accept, leads me to see everything which is different from me and 
which I am forced to accept. From the outset, it is evident to the learner that 
there are degrees in the mastery of an art or practice that range from the 
learner’s situation to standards of excellence, which comprise the authority of 
that art or practice: “An understanding of any art involves a recognition of 
hierarchy and authority. There are very evident degrees of merit, there are 
heights and distances (...)”36. The standards of excellence are independent of the 
subjectivity of the learner, as MacIntyre notes: “In the realm of practices the 
authority of both goods and standards operates in such a way as to rule out all 
subjectivist and emotivist analyses of judgment”37. 
                                                 
33 SG, p. 89. 
34 “By ‘practice’ I am going to mean any coherent and complex form of socially established 
cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are 
realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate 
to, and partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.” (After Virtue 187). 
35AV, p. 190. 
36 SG, p. 88. 
37AV, p.190. 
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In relation to practices and the “open” definition of the standards that 
inspire them, Jordan points to the affinity that can be found between Murdoch 
and MacIntyre. In MacIntyre’s view, the standards are subject to critique and 
refinement in function of the progress of the practice when mastery has been 
achieved. This, however, is not that case of the learner who, while still 
developing in the practice, must accept the authority of the standard before 
being able to question it;the standards of a practice are only subject to 
innovation from the perspective of correct judgment. On this point, concerning 
the possibility of refining the standards, Jordan sees a parallelism between 
Murdoch and MacIntyre:  
MacIntyre’s account here is importantly similar to Murdoch’s in this 
regard. He, like Murdoch, works in a dynamism to standards by which 
these standards can be refined and made better. (…)Murdoch argues that, 
just as we can see a conception of perfection (although not fully defined) 
generating hierarchies within everyday human practices—hierarchies that 
we experience as authoritative—so we can see that the conception of moral 
perfection (i.e., the Good) works in the same way. A conception of 
perfection generates hierarchies of moral value to which we are subject, but 
these hierarchies are also in the process of being deepened38. 
 
Humility 
 
The recognition of authority supposes an attitude of humility that is 
indispensable for learning. Against humility stands pride, which we must 
understand as the act of putting oneself before what is other. Murdoch refers to 
humility in speaking of the artist and the artist’s relationship to reality. The 
Artist (upper-case) is someone who bows to the superiority of reality to express 
not so much what he sees as what is there. Humility is a virtue, and for the 
artist, just as for a person who is not an artist, it is difficult to renounce the 
creative I and be left (only) with a recreating I. The artist is a student of 
reality:“The honesty and humility required of the student –not to pretend to 
know what one does not know –is the preparation for the honesty and humility 
of the scholar who does not even feeltempted to suppress the fact which damns 
                                                 
38 JORDAN, Iris Murdoch’s Genealogy of the Modern Self, p. 198. 
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his theory. (...)[S]tudying is normally an exercise of virtue as well as of talent, 
and shows us a fundamental way in which virtue is related to the real world”39. 
The humility to which MacIntyre refers is the humility of the learner who is 
interested in discovering the truth:“And hence the acquisition of that virtue 
which the will requires to be so guided, humility, is the necessary first step in 
education or in self-education”40. 
In both authors, humility is a virtue that becomes a prerequisite to 
knowledge of the truth. 
 
Moral use of literature 
 
Murdoch and MacIntyre both defend the use of literature to achieve moral 
aims. In Murdoch’s view, the limitation of language often makes stories more 
effective at illuminating reality than rational explanations: “We may consider 
here the importance of parables and stories as moral guides”41.The moral truth 
suggested by some literary stories, such as the story of the prodigal son, is easier 
to capture than it would be if one were to attempt explanation through rational 
concepts. Murdoch adds: “Literature tells us things and teaches us things”42.A 
portion of Murdoch’s writings are dedicated to clarifying what makes a work of 
art a great work of art, and what role a great work of art has in morality. The 
constant characteristic of human beings, Murdoch says, is egoism, the human 
capacity to see reality through the filter of one’s I. Self-centeredness prevents 
humans from understanding their surroundings and leads them to see reality 
with themselves at its center, a perspective that is tantamount to seeing all 
reality outside themselves only in terms of their own self-interest. Murdoch’s 
view is that egoism is the first and greatest enemy of morality. The interest of a 
great work of art stems from its ability to stir the individual, if only for a 
moment, to consider reality from a decentred perspective. Murdoch grants great 
art the force of removing an individual from the smallness of his world, shaped 
by the personal ego, in order to come face-to-face with a reality in which others 
can be appreciated in their own uniqueness. What makes a work of art great is 
its ability to reflect the truth; that is the source of its magnetism. The capacity 
of a work of art comes out of the disposition of the artist himself. What the 
                                                 
39 SG, p. 89. 
40 A. MACINTYRE, Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry. Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and 
Tradition, London, Duckworth 1990, p.44. 
41 EM, p. 90. 
42 EM,p. 257. 
MARGARITA MAURI 
 
406 
 
work of art achieves in the spectator or reader is found first in the artist who 
has been able to transcend his personal I in order to see reality in its accurate 
dimension,a dimension that the work of art offers to the public and that is 
transformative for anyone capable of being transformed.  
In MacIntyre’s view, the stories told to children as tales introduce them to 
the world of the meaning of things, and further, they are tools for learning 
virtues: 
Deprive children of stories and you leave them unscripted, anxious 
stutterers in their actions as in their words. Hence there is no way to give us 
an understanding of any society, including our own, except though the 
stock of stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. (...) [T]he 
telling of stories has a key part in educating us into the virtues43. 
 
Virtue 
 
Murdoch has been identified as one of the authors who have opened the 
way to the contemporary recuperation of the concept of virtue. Her repeated 
complaints against the tilt toward a moral philosophy inspired only by duty 
and moral rules brought about a reaction to reclaim the concepts of the Good, 
virtue and moral character. MacIntyre’s moral philosophy is an example of this 
reaction. Murdoch has the merit of rescuing the importance of virtue in moral 
life from obscurity, while MacIntyre went on to develop these theses. However, 
when their two definitions are compared, it can be seen that the points of 
reflection and interest that inspire their concepts of virtue are different. 
Here is Murdoch: 
Of course virtue is good habit and dutiful action. But the background 
condition of such habit and such action, in human beings, is a just mode of 
vision and a good quality of consciousness. It is a task to come to see the 
world as it is44. 
Now compare MacIntyre: 
A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which 
tends to enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices 
                                                 
43AV, p. 216. 
44SG, p. 91; original emphasis 
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and the lack of which effectively prevents us from achieving any such 
goods45. 
Murdoch takes greater interest in analyzing the prerequisites of virtue than 
in explaining how dutiful action corresponds to a given virtue. The notion of 
“habit” in the sense of habitus was fundamental for thinkers like Aristotle and 
St Thomas Aquinas, whom Philippa Foot46says are necessary for any student 
wishing to know more about virtue, but “habit” does not appear to be a central 
concern of Murdoch’s approach. Therefore, the conditions of virtue often serve 
Murdoch to define virtue itself. For example, the correct “vision” of my 
surroundings is a condition of virtue, but it is also the way to define it: “(...) 
[V]irtue is the attempt to pierce the veil of selfish consciousness and join the 
world as it really is.”47. As MacIntyre remarks in response to Murdoch’s 
thinking:“To be virtuous, according to her, is not to exhibit a collection of 
traits, it is to be moving with a certain kind of directedness”48. 
By contrast, MacIntyre links virtue, both its acquisition and its exercise, to 
a collaborative activity and emphasizes the community aspect of virtue. Yet he 
does support Murdoch when she singles out disposition in morality: 
The moral agent’s tasks do not and cannot begin only after questions of fact 
have been settled. For, as both Simone Weil and Iris Murdoch have 
insisted, one sine qua non of human goodness is the ability to see things as 
they are; and to see things as they are is a morally difficult task. (...) A part 
of moral philosophy and moral psychology must therefore be concerned 
with how we come to see things as they are, the variety of ways in which we 
may fail, the variety of causes of failure, and the kind of discipline that can 
overcome these obstacles49. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45AV, p. 91; original emphasis. 
46P. FOOT, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy, Berkeley, University of 
California Press 1978, p. 1. 
47SG, p.93 
48I. MURDOCH,Good for Nothing, “London Review of Books”, June 1982, p.15. 
49A. MACINTYRE, Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy, Notre Dame, 
Indiana, University of Notre Dame Press 1983, pp.12-13. 
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3. Conclusion 
 
Although we have two authors who differ in their way of conceiving and 
doing philosophy, we could say that what appear to be only intuitions in 
Murdoch become extended theoretical explanations in the works of 
MacIntyre.Taken as wholes, the philosophies of the two writers respond to 
different concerns and draw on the past indifferentways. They coincide in 
analyzing the present, but even as they rummage in the present, they highlight 
different elements. Murdoch is interested in combating an image of human 
beings inherited from the Enlightenment, Romanticism and the liberal 
tradition50and stresses the importance of the inner life in moral life. MacIntyre 
in contrast develops his philosophy by seeking the social, historical and 
philosophical origins of moral emotivism. While Murdoch’s concern is the 
individual, MacIntyre focuses on the individual immersed in the community51.If 
Murdoch’s historical reference is Plato52,MacIntyre resorts to a tradition that 
dates from Aristotle. 
I do not concur with Edward T. Oakes, who describes the two philosophies 
as rivals and suggests that MacIntyre had difficulties in responding to the 
theses in Murdoch’s philosophy: “His work [MacIntyre’s] is not necessarily the 
best moral philosophy now being written –Iris Murdoch, for one, may offer a 
rival philosophy he would find difficult to answer(...)”53.However, the remarks 
of Michael Schwartz also strike me as exaggerated, when he states that the two 
philosophies are equal and that MacIntyre’s philosophy might not exist 
without Murdoch’s: “to argue against the claim of rival philosophy and assert 
that MacIntyre’s philosophy is analogous to Murdoch’s, and furthermore could 
not exist without Murdoch’s”54.More fitting seem the remarks of Jordan who 
holds that one of the affinities between Murdoch and MacIntyre is found in 
their search for an alternative to the reigning philosophy of the day:  
                                                 
50EM, p.287 
51 It is characteristic of Iris Murdoch’s later novels that all goodness referring to the Form of 
Good seems to entail that there is no such thing as a good way or life or a good form of 
human community. Good is an object only of individual aspiration.” MACINTYRE, Which 
World Do You See?, p. 9. 
52 In fact, MacIntyre identifies himself as a neo-Platonist: “(...) the revival of an essentially 
Neoplatonic view of Plato, in one version by John Findley, in another by Iris Murdoch.”, 
MACINTYRE, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?. London: Duckworth, 1988, p.94. 
53OAKES, The Achievement of Alasdair MacIntyre, p. 22. 
54 SCHWARTZ, Moral Vision: Iris Murdoch and Alasdair MacIntyre, p.323. 
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Like Murdoch, Alasdair MacIntyre argues that for all their apparent 
differences, analytic moral philosophy and the continental philosophy of 
Nietzsche and Sartre share a deeper, and more important, commonality. 
MacIntyre analyzes this commonality in terms of emotivism, whereas 
Murdoch seeks to cast it in terms of Existentialism. But it is clear that both 
Murdoch and MacIntrye are united in their efforts to provide an alternative 
moral philosophy to one where the will is the creator of value55. 
Based on the reference to the concept of “rival philosophies” developed by 
MacIntyre, we have here two different focuses within the same Western 
tradition. Being different, the two thinkers’ philosophies disagree on some 
questions, even in how the problems are framed. However, by virtue of 
belonging to the same tradition, they were able to carry on a philosophical 
dialogue supported by a common grounding in shared fundamental beliefs. 
                                                 
55 JORDAN, Iris Murdoch’s Genealogy of the Modern Self, pp. 45-46. 
